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BAR BRIEFS

THE PRESIDENT'S PAGE
As the session of the Legislature starts, we all realize anew that
we have too many laws, and yet know that changing conditions demand
new legislation. The spirit of law making in this country has been
wrong. Men, seeing an evil, assume that a law can remedy it, and rush
to ill considered legislation without any study of the nature of the evil
or the effective remedy. Law can never be a panacea for all our
troubles. For such evils as it can alleviate, it can do so much more
effectively if the situation is studied carefully beforehand, and legislation
framed with the aid of lawyers who have had experience in the working
of existing laws.
Lawyers ought to be in the forefront of this work. The Bar Association, as a body, ought to be in the forefront when proposals have
been carefully discussed at its meetings and a policy adopted. It is open
to grave doubt, though there may be emergencies justifying exceptions,
whether the Association as such should take any stand on proposed legislation that has not been the subject of consideration at its annual meeting.
On subjects that have not been considered by the Association, but
come up in the Legislature, let us hope that the lawyers of the State, as
individuals, will give them their consideration and study, and give the
Legislature such aid as they are able in arriving at a wise solution.
On one subject particularly there is practical unanimity, and the
Association has taken a definite stand. That is for a substantial increase of salary for judges. The Committee on Legislation is supporting the bill, under a mandate from the Association. All state salaries
are probably too low, but the evil is a comparatively minor one as applied
to officials who hold office for a short term, and a crying disgrace as
applied to judges whose life work is on the Bench. A judge, once elected,
loses his law practice, and can with great difficulty regain it. The time
is fast approaching when we cannot get efficient men on the Bench for
the salaries we pay. A few thousand dollars spent in paying good men
will save itself many times over. It is to be hoped that the lawyers of
the State as a whole will take an active interest in this act of belated
justice.
We should make no apology for lobbying. Honest and aboveboard
lobbying is honorable and useful activity. No men are perfect, and the
legislators have far too much to do to be able to give every proposition
the study it deserves. They should, and I believe they will, welcome
aid given them in good faith. The lobbying which is reprehensible, and
which has brought the word into disrepute, is the endeavor to secure
or block legislation in behalf of special interests, while concealing the
lobbyer's connection with or employment by such interests. That is
plain dishonesty, as much as if a Judge on the Bench were to be secretly
retained by one of the parties to a lawsuit.-PREsmENT JOHN H. LEwis.

REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
A. E. ANGUS
Hulett vs. Snook. Board of Township Supervisors entered an
order laying out a public highway and awarding damages to the owner
of the land taken for highway purposes. The owner appealed to district
court, and thereafter the Board entered a second order, the first order
being defective, in that it did not describe the land properly. No appeal
taken from the second order. Trial on appeal from first order, plaintiff
appearing in person and by attorney and stipulating that the appeal
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should relate to the amended order. Verdict for Board. Motion to
vacate judgment was denied. HELD: Trial court was correct in denying motion to vacate judgment and dismiss proceedings as plaintiffs are
estopped by their stipulation and acquiesence in the trial.
State vs. Ehr. Defendant was arrested on a complaint charging
him with violating Chapter 142, Laws of 1927, relating to hours of

employment of females. Defendant demurred to the complaint, alleging that it did not state a public offense because Chapter 142 is unconstitutional, being in violation of certain articles of the State Constitution
and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Demurrer was sustained in County Court. HELD: Reversed. The
eight hour law does not unreasonably interfere with the right of contract,
and is valid under the police power of the State. That part of the law
under which complaint is made is sufficient to stand alone and is not
affected by subsequent amendments which may be unconstitutional, even
though such amendments contain a repealing clause.
Pfeiffer vs. Workmen's CompensationBureau. Pfeiffer was injured
in the course of employment by a wrench which hit him on or near the
left eye while repairing an automobile. A tumor was found shortly
after, which was not originally caused by the injury, and had, at the
time of injury, resulted in about 16 per cent loss of vision of one eye and
50 per cent loss of vision of the other. Claim was denied on the ground
of pre-existing disease. The evidence, on trial, showed that the accident
had probably accelerated the pre-existing condition, which was more or
less dormant, total blindness resulting within a few months after injury.
HELD: If competent evidence traces a causal connection between accelerated condition of the affliction and the accident occurring in the course
of employment, and if no other cause of acceleration is shown, then
claimant is entitled to recover even though the origin of such affliction
is not shown.
Oberg vs. Workmen's Compensation Bureau. Plaintiff was in the
employ of Johnson, a sub-contractor for Schultz Bros., who were insured
under the Compensation Law. After finishing work for Johnson,
claimant went to Williston on a new job. Some unused dynamite caps
were left at the site of the former road work. Johnson offered to pay
Oberg to destroy the caps. Plaintiff returned from Williston, and
while visiting at the farm where the caps were located, attempted to
destroy the caps by exploding them, using a fuse. Several were exploded
singly, then the balance were placed in a stump and fuse applied. Due
to shortness of the fuse, the explosion occurred before plaintiff could
get away, resulting in total blindness. The Bureau denied the claim on
the grounds: i. Plaintiff was an independent contractor; 2. If an
employee, it was casual employment and not in the usual course of the
employer's business. HELD: Plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, and was injured in the course of employment.
Streeter vs. Farmers Press. Suit for libel, plaintiff claiming the
defendant published a defamatory article, the more material part of
which read: "It is now developing by unmistakable evidence that this
was a trumped up political scheme plotted as far back as last April,
through which it was expected to land the Record for official paper,
by means of a planned, deliberate violation of the election laws of the

BAR BRIEFS
State. It is apparent that he printed these ballots without rotating the
names intentionally and for the designed purpose of taking an unfair
advantage over the Free Press. This act of perfidy on the part of
Frisky Buckles, occurring at the primaries is not so fatal to the Free
Press as had it been pulled off in the fall, and we are glad
he exposed this crookedness in the primary." Verdict for plaintiff.
HELD: Affirmed. The publication exceeds fair comment and criticism
as the libelous statements are set forth as facts.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
In the December issue of the Los Angeles Bar Association Bulletin
we find an article by Hon. L. R. Yankwich, Judge of the Superior Court,
in which he designates some recent uses or applications of the Declaratory
Judgments Act.
In the first reported California case, Blakeslee vs. Wilson, 19o Cal.
479, it was resorted to by an attorney for a determination of his rights
under a contract of employment on a contingent fee basis. As the
question arose on demurrer, the Supreme Court, while upholding the
constitutionality of the statute, had no occasion to determine what relief
could or could not be granted under it.
In James vs. Hall, 55 Cal. App. Dec. 355, it was used to determine
a person's rights to certain motion picture films and productions.
Again, where the record showed that a controversy not only existed
but was being continually waged as to the rights of parties under a lease,
the Court, in Lane Mortgage Co., vs. Crenshaw, 56 Cal. App. Dec. 1163,
held it to b6 the duty of the trial court to determine such rights.
The Kansas statute has been used in a number of cases. In one
case, State vs. Kansas City, 1o Kan. 603, 204 Pac. 690, the statute was
employed to determine the right of a city to issue internal improvement
bonds, bearing a rate of interest greater than five per cent, without
reserving the privilege of prepayment at the end of five years, and the
Court said this:
"The proceedings in this- case serve to illustrate -operation of the
Declaratory Judgment Act. Execution of the city's internal improvement program placed it in this dilemma: If privilege of prepayment
were not written in the bonds, the city and its officers were exposed to
prosecution by the State for abuse of corporate power and violation
of law, and the securities might not be marketable. If privilege of
prepayment were written in the bonds, a heavy financial burden would
be placed on the taxpayers, perhaps unnecessarily. Formerly, the city
would have been compelled to choose one course or the other, and abide
the consequences. The law officers of the State could not give a binding interpretation of the statute, and, because of its ambiguity, could not
consent to the course which the city claimed it was authorized to pursue.
Therefore, a controversy existed, justifiable under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The action was commenced in the district court on
February 7, 1922, and the defendant answered instanter. The cause
was heard on the petition and answer, and a stipulation that the pleadings
Stated the facts. The declaration of the district court was rendered
February 7, and the appeal was lodged in this Court on February io.
This Court was in session when the appeal was filed. Because of the
public importance of the question involved, the cause was advanced for
immediate hearing, and on February io it was submitted for final decision, an oral argument and briefs of counsel which accompanied the

